Why Don't Foreign Firms Cooperate in U.S. Antidumping Investigations?: An Empirical Analysis

18/06/2015 10:20 - 500 Views

Michael O. Moore
Department of Economics/Elliott School
George Washington University
Alan Fox a b
U.S. International Trade Commission
12 June 2006

Foreign firms face punitive antidumping duties if they do not cooperate with the US Department of Commerce (DOC). For example, 37% of all foreign firms involved inantidumping investigations in the US chose faced “facts available” margins for the 1995-2002 period, with average Antidumping duties of 31% for cooperating foreign firms, compared to 87% for those who do not. The existing literature has focused on how DOCdiscretion has led to foreign firm non-cooperation. This paper instead examines individual foreign firm’s decisions about whether to cooperate during this same period. We find evidence that non-cooperation is consistent with a model of foreign firms rationally choosing not to cooperate, rather than simply a result of investigating authority bias against imports