Commentaries

Granting Market Economy Status to China: An analysis of WTO law and of selected WTO members' policy
Granting Market Economy Status to China: An analysis of WTO law and of selected WTO members' policy

15/11/2016

Under Section 15 of the Chinese WTO Accession Protocol, China can be treated as a non-market economy (NME) in anti-dumping proceedings if Chinese firms cannot prove that they operate under market economy conditions. The main implication of NME status in anti-dumping proceedings is the possibility to use other methodologies to determine the normal value of the good, instead of using domestic prices to compute the dumping margin...
One year to go: The debate over China's market economy status (MES) heats up
One year to go: The debate over China's market economy status (MES) heats up

15/11/2016

Market economy status (MES) – a technical term used in antidumping investigations – has come to the top of the international agenda, bringing heated discussions on whether or not China will soon be granted this status. China argues that its WTO accession documents foresee an automatic acquisition of MES after 11 December 2016. Yet for many other WTO members, the text in question – Section 15 of China's Protocol of Accession – is subject to interpretation.
The impact of Canadian anti-dumping and countervailing measures on domestic shipments, investments, employment, and imports:1989-2014
The impact of Canadian anti-dumping and countervailing measures on domestic shipments, investments, employment, and imports:1989-2014

15/11/2016

The determinations of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (the Tribunal) in anti-dumping and countervailing duty cases under the Special Import Measures Act (SIMA) have an important impact on shipments, investments and employment in the domestic manufacturing and agricultural sectors, and on imports of goods into Canada.
Global Steel Overcapacity: Trade Remedy “Cure” Is Worse than the “Disease”
Global Steel Overcapacity: Trade Remedy “Cure” Is Worse than the “Disease”

15/11/2016

Antidumping and countervailing duty (AD/CVD) measures are unable to fix the low-price problem afflicting U.S. steel producers because they amount to no more than a band-aid that can’t heal the wound. Worse, such trade remedy measures do great harm to manufacturing companies by making steel in the United States higher in price than in most of the rest of the world. This tends to make downstream manufacturers less competitive, thus encouraging imports of steel-containing products from other countries...
Change in the methodology for anti-dumping investigations concerning China
Change in the methodology for anti-dumping investigations concerning China

04/10/2016

When China joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in December 2001, a transitional arrangement for its accession allowed for a specific methodology for calculation of dumping. This transitional arrangement was introduced in Section 15 of China's Accession Protocol.. Some of these provisions will expire in December 2016. The Commission is studying the implications of the expiry of these provisions on the EU anti-dumping and anti-subsidy legislation. This examination covers legal aspects, and possible economic and employment effects This examination is ongoing.
The positive and negative effects of the use of anti-dumping policy in developing countries
The positive and negative effects of the use of anti-dumping policy in developing countries

08/09/2016

Despite worldwide decline in the use of tariffs since World War II, the use of Anti-dumping (AD) policy, has risen in absolute and relative importance in recent times (Webb, 1992; Cuyvers and Weifeng, 2008).
It’s Time to Dump Nonmarket Economy Treatment
It’s Time to Dump Nonmarket Economy Treatment

08/09/2016

Trade officials in the United States and Europe use what is called “nonmarket economy methodology” in antidumping cases against imports from China. That practice ignores the actual prices used by Chinese producers and results in unpredictable and unrealistically high antidumping duties.
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