The Dispute Settlement Crisis in the World Trade Organization: Causes and Cures
16/03/2018 12:00
Author: Tetyana Payosova, Gary Clyde Hufbauer, and Jeffrey J. Schott
The World Trade Organization (WTO) has long been considered an effective institution because of its enforceable dispute resolution procedures. Its process calls for ad hoc panels to issue rulings on disputes over member country
compliance with their WTO rights and obligations, subject to review by a standing Appellate Body composed of seven “judges” (technically members1). Decisions by the Appellate Body are final and binding, and generally respected by
disputing parties. Since its inception in 1995, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism has resolved an impressive number of trade disputes and has earned a reputation as the “crown jewel” of the global trading system.
For more information, please find attached:
The World Trade Organization (WTO) has long been considered an effective institution because of its enforceable dispute resolution procedures. Its process calls for ad hoc panels to issue rulings on disputes over member country
compliance with their WTO rights and obligations, subject to review by a standing Appellate Body composed of seven “judges” (technically members1). Decisions by the Appellate Body are final and binding, and generally respected by
disputing parties. Since its inception in 1995, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism has resolved an impressive number of trade disputes and has earned a reputation as the “crown jewel” of the global trading system.
For more information, please find attached:
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The Dispute Settlement Crisis in the WTO Causes and Cures |
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