The U.S. antidumping law protects American industries from supposedly unfair import competition. Specifically, it imposes extra duties on goods from a particular country or group of countries if two conditions are met: first, the Department of Commerce must find that the goods are being sold in the United States at “dumped” prices; second, the International Trade Commission must determine that the imports in question are causing or threatening “material injury” to domestic producers of the “like product.”

This paper examines the relationship between antidumping filings and macroeconomic factors. We show that real exchange rate fluctuations affect the two criteria for dumping in opposite ways, making the overall effect on filings ambiguous in theory.

Using a newly constructed database, this paper examines the tariff-jumping response of all firm and product combinations subject to U.S. AD investigations from 1980-1990. The results strongly support the hypothesis that tariff-jumping is only a realistic option for multinational firms from industrialized countries.

The World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement system has evolved from the GATT system. As shown in Table 1, some improvements have been made as a result of the changeover.

Political reality suggests that any government that attempts to establish or maintain an open import regime must have at hand some sort of pressure valve - some process to manage occasional pressures for exceptional or sector-specific protection. Since the 1980s antidumping has served this function.