Antidumping As Safeguard Policy

11/12/2007 12:00 - 1380 Views

Author: J. Michael Finger, Francis Ng, Sonant Wangchuk
 
Political reality suggests that any government that attempts to establish or maintain an open import regime must have at hand some sort of pressure valve - some process to manage occasional pressures for exceptional or sector-specific protection. Since the 1980s antidumping has served this function. An antidumping petition is the usual way in which an industry, beset by troublesome imports, will request protection - to say the same thing from the other side, an antidumping investigation is the usual way that the government will consider a request for protection. We will, in this paper, treat antidumping from the general safeguard perspective. We begin with a discussion of how the safeguard instrument has evolved in the GATT/WTO system - through the post Uruguay Round period in which antidumping has become the most commonly used instrument of import politics for developing countries, as well as developed. Looking at the record of antidumping cases since the Uruguay Round we demonstrate, for example, that the developing countries now use the instrument even more intensely than the traditional users: Australia, Canada, the European Community and the United States. We then review the usefulness of antidumping as a general safeguard instrument and provide some suggestions on the characteristics of a more sensible safeguard instrument - one which provides a means for a government to manage pressures for protection in a way that (a) helps it to reach economically sensible answers as to when to impose new protection, and (b) supports rather than undercuts the politics of openness. We conclude that antidumping does not serve this function well.
Tải tài liệu
20150627131340722001adassafeguardpolicy0pdf
Quảng cáo sản phẩm