This article  uses the EU’s decision to simultaneously impose anti-dumping and countervailing duties against Chinese coated fine papers as a case study to illustrate the complexities involved in EU’s trade defence regime against products originating from nonmarket  economies.  Four  specific issues  are dealt with: analogue country, market economy treatment, individual treatment and double remedy. In examining  the reasonableness of the European Commission’s choice of the analogue country, this article develops a two-step approach, firstly against the Basic AD Regulation and secondly against Article X:3 of the GATT 1994.  In view of the positive results of the request for individual treatment, this article argues that the EU may pass the  ?as applied? complainant in the WTO dispute settlement  mechanism. With regard to the proposed amendment to the Basic AD Regulation, it may also pass the ?as such? complaint. In light of the fact that the EU is a third party taking the same position as the respondent in US  –  Anti-Dumping and Countervailing  Duties,  this article explores the rationale behind the Commission’s determination to impose concurrent anti-dumping and countervailing duties since one single anti-dumping duty may provide sufficient level of protection. This article argues that the rationale is mainly because of the perspective expiry of alternative price comparability methodology as provided in China’s accession protocol, the different  nature  of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations, and practical benefits of concurrent imposition.