Is  China  complying with its  World Trade  Organization (WTO)  anti-dumping (AD) commitments? The  strong  import competition created by  the rapid opening of  China?s domestic  market,  and the continued state  involvement in its industry  could conceivably generate domestic pressure on the Chinese government to use AD measures intensively and possibly  illegally.  Moreover, since  its  exports  are  a primary  global  target of  AD actions,China might be expected to retaliate by levying questionable AD measures on imports. 

 

Despite  factors  conducive  to a more  protectionist bias  and possible  non-compliance,  I argue that China is not only complying with AD rules, but that it is demonstrating domestic restraint, and to a certain extent, a pro-liberalization interpretation of the rules. This policy along with China?s Doha Round negotiating proposals on AD suggest what is characterized in the paper as a „compliance-plus? policy. The fact that China has chosen to pursue such a policy is not trivial taking into account the more protectionist paths taken by other key WTO members. On a broader level, this case study aims at contributing to the contemporary debate regarding China?s changing role in the global arena. By complying with WTO rules, China is demonstrating that  it  is accepting, following and becoming increasingly  vested in their maintenance.